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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE :MATTER OF THE l 
ESTATE OF CLARENCE Case No. 
HENRY McFARLAND, 10506 
Deceased. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal by the Executrix of the Estate 
of Clarence Henry :McFarland, Deceased, from an 
Order of the District Court denying the motion of such 
Executrix to set aside an Order Confirming Sale of 
real property and to dismiss the petition for Confirma-
tion of Sale of such property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
The lower Court overruled the motion of the Ex-
e('utrix, the appellant herein, and ordered that the Order 
1 
Confirming Sale of real property theretofore entered 
should remain in full force and effect (R 21). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
While the appellant has failed and declined to 
submit a brief outlining its position or contentions or 
relief sought, it is assumed that appellant seeks a 
reversal of the Order of the District Court denying 
appellant's motion hereinafter referred to. 
Respondents ask only that the appeal be dismissed 
and the order of the lower Court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The above-entitled matter is predicated upon an 
Order Confirming Sale of an interest in real property 
in the above-entitled estate. Sarah Jane McFarland, 
the duly qualified and acting Executrix of the estate, 
petitioned the Court for confirmation of sale of an 
undivided three-fourths interest in and to certain real 
property in Salt Lake County, Utah, said undivided 
interest being the interest which the estate held therein, 
the other undivided interest being held by one, Leslie 
W. and Deon B. Davis. An agreement for the sale 
of the undivided interest of the decedent, Clarence 
Henry McFarland, and of his estate, was entered into 
by said Executrix simultaneously with an agreement 
on the part of the said Davises to sell their undivided 
2 
interest. The purported purchaser of the estate interest 
was one, 'Villiam C. Roderick, who, according to the 
Petition of the Executrix for Confirmation of Sale, 
had agreed to pay a total of $3,500.00 for the whole 
property, three-fourths of which (or $2,625.00) would 
become an asset of the estate by virtue of its interest 
in the whole property (R 2). The petition of the Ex-
ecutrix further alleged that the amount offered was 
in excess of 90% of the value of said real property. 
The petition of the said Executrix further set forth 
as the basis for the petition that it was to the best ad-
vantage and interest of the estate that the same be sold 
and the sale confirmed by reason of the location and the 
joint ownership. 
The Executrix of the estate, who signed the Peti-
tion for Confirmation, namely, Sarah Jane McFarland, 
was and is likewise the sole beneficiary of the estate 
under the vVill of the decedent (R 29). 
The Petition for Confirmation of Sale prayed that 
a time and place be fixed for the hearing of the petition 
and that notice be given to the persons entitled thereto 
in the manner required by law and the Order of the 
Court. Due and proper notice was given of the hearing 
on said petition by both mailing to all interested parties 
and by posting notice in three public places (R 27 
and 28). 
On the date set for hearing the Petition for Con-
firmation of the Sale, to-wit, on the 21st day of October, 
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the Court, the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow sitting, 
in open Court, opened the matter to public bid an<l 
asked whether or not there were any other, further or 
better bids for the property. Thereupon, Gordon C. 
Holt and Sterling G. Webber submitted a bid based 
upon $4,000.00 for the whole of said property, which 
would result in three-fourths thereof, or $3,000.00, 
being bid for the interest of the estate in said property, 
which said bid was more than 10% higher than the bid 
theretofore made and was considered by the Court to 
be a better bid than that previously made. The said 
Holt and Webber thereupon tendered to the Execu-
trix, through the Court, more than 10% of said bid 
and further tendered, through the Court, a written 
agreement and offer to purchase said property on the 
basis therein set forth ( R 5, 6, and 17). No other or 
better bids were made, and the Court thereupon sold 
said property to the said Holt and Webber and con-
firmed the said sale. 
The Executrix, through her attorney, or otherwise, 
failed to have prepared an Order Confirming Sale, and 
the said Holt and Webber thereupon presented to the 
Court an Order Confirming Sale, and on the 24th day 
of March, 1965, the Court entered its Order Confirming 
Sale of said property to Gordon C. Holt and Sterling 
G. 'Vebber and ordered the Executrix to issue an 
Executrix Deed for said property in customary form 
upon tender of the balance of the bid price therefor. 
Notwithstanding the tender of such purchase price and 
request for said Deed, the Executrix failed and refused 
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to execute and deliver the same to the said Holt and 
\Vebber. 
On the 6th day of April, 1965, the Executrix filed 
a l\lotion for an Order dismissing the Petition for Con-
firmation of Sale and to declare null and void the Order 
Confirming Sale to Gordon C. Holt and Sterling G. 
\l\T ebber dated March 24, 1965 (R 7-9). 
Objections to said Motion were filed by Holt and 
\V ebber ( R 14-17). The Motion was considered finally 
by the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow on November 
2:.:!, 1965, at which time he overruled the Motion to set 
aside the Order Confirming Sale ( R 20) and on said 
date issued his Order denying said motion (R 21). 
From the Order denying the motion of the Ex-
ecutrix to set aside the Order Confirming Sale, the 
Executrix appealed. The Executrix, through her coun-
sel of record, has chosen not to file a brief in the action 
and simply stand on the record. Hence, the necessity 
for respondents to detail the facts of the action as above 
set forth. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
TlIE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISl\IISSED 
FOR FAILURE OF APPELLANT TO PER-
FECT THE APPEAL OR CONFORM TO THR 
RULES. 
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The appellant has failed to perfect its appeal by 
failure to comply with the rules of this Court requiring 
the filing of an appellant's brief within one month after 
the record on appeal was filed in the Supreme Court 
(Rule 75 (p) ( 1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
Not only has the appellant failed to so comply, but the 
appellant has served notice upon the Court that it does 
not intend to comply with that rule. (See appellant's 
document filed in this Court on March 21, 1966 entitled 
"Notice of Reliance on Record on Appeal and U pou 
Certain Statutory Provisions and Cases." 
This Court held in the case of LePasiotes vs. Dins-
dale, 242 P. 2d, 121 Ut. 359, that where an appellant 
failed to specifically designate matters constituting 
prejudicial error so that respondents could clearly an<l 
fairly meet appellant's contentions, that the Court will 
not review such claims of prejudicial error so generally 
assigned. See also Lawrence vs. Butterfield, 12 Ut. 
2d. 347, 366 P. 2d, 607. 
By reason of the failure and refusal of appellant 
to comply with the rules of the Court, we urge that 
the appeal should be dismissed. (Rule 73 (a) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure.) 
II 
THE ORDER OF THE COURT BELO\V 
WAS PROPER AND SH 0 UL D BE AF-
FIRMED. 
6 
A. 1lhe Motion of Appellant Was Not 1limely 
Made. 
The Order of the Court confirming the sale of the 
real property in question was made and entered by the 
Court on the 24th day of March, 1965 (R 6). Such an 
Order became a final judgment as to the matters there-
in set forth upon the entry thereof, the sale from that 
time being valid and binding (75-10-16, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953). If the appellant was to interpose 
any motion to set aside the judgment or to alter or 
amend the judgment of the Court, such motion was 
required to be served not later than ten ( 10) days after 
the entry of the judgment. (Rule 59 (b) and 59 ( e), 
Rules of Civil Procedure.) The motion of the Execu-
trix to set aside the Order of the Court was not made 
nor filed until April 6, 1965, which was twelve days 
after the entry of the judgment, and hence, was not 
within the time prescribed by the rules of the Court. 
B. The Sale was a Public Sale and the Order of 
the CoU1·t Confirming the Sale was Valid and Proper. 
ln the argument hereinafter set forth, we will 
endeavor to cover all phases of the matter which were 
presented by verbal argument of the appellant in the 
Court below, in view of the fact that appellant has 
chosen to file no brief or argument in support of its 
contentions in this Court. Likewise, the code sections 
mentioned in the document filed in this Court by the 
appellant entitled "Notice of Reliance Upon Record 
on Appeal" etc., will be referred to herein. 
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The primary contention, and in fact the sole con-
tention, of the appellant in its arguments in the Court 
below, was that in spite of the fact that appellant-
executrix had filed its Petition for Confirmation of 
Sale setting forth grounds and reasons therefor and 
alleging that the amount offered for the property as 
sought to be condemned was fair and in excess of 90% 
of the value of the property, that nevertheless, inas-
much as the appraisal was not in fact made and on 
file, the Court could not properly sell or confirm a sale 
of the property in these proceedings. 
The appellant then replied and apparently now 
relies upon Section 75-10-12, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, which reads as follows: 
"75-10-12. Confirmation of private sale. No 
sale of real estate at private sale shall be con-
firmed by the court unless the sum offered is at 
least ninety per cent of the appraised value 
thereof, nor unless such real estate has been 
appraised within one year of the time of such 
sale. If it has not been so appraised, or if the 
court is satisfied that the appraisment is too high 
or too low, appraisers must be appointed, and 
they must make an appraisement thereof as in 
the case of an original appraisement. This may 
be done at any time before the sale or the con-
firmation thereof." 
It should be observed that the Petition for Con-
firmation of Sale signed and verified by Sarah Jane 
McFarland, the Executrix of the Estate of Clarence 
Henry McFarland, Deceased, and the appellant herein, 
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after setting forth as the primary basis for the sale 
that it would be to the advantage, benefit and interest 
of the estate because of the fact that it was simply an 
undivided interest in property held in common owner-
ship with someone other than the estate, prayed that 
notice be given of the hearing in the manner provided 
by the law and by the Order of the Court. 
Notice was accordingly given to all persons inter-
ested and to the public generally through the posting 
of notices in three public places, to-wit, the west front 
entrance of the County Courthouse, on a public posting 
board at 33rd South and State Streets, and in the Post 
Office in Murray, all in Salt Lake County, Utah, where 
said notices remained posted for ten days. Said notices 
set forth the terms of the off er theretofore made on 
the property so that the public was informed with 
regard thereto and thereby invited to appear and to 
bid at the time set for the sale of said property (R 27 
and 28). 
At the time appointed for the sale as set forth 
in the public notices thereof, the Court opened the 
matter up for public bid, asking for any other, further 
or higher or better bids than the one which had been 
made and concerning which the confirmation was sought 
(R 5). Such having been done, the sale then became 
a "public sale" and not a "private sale" of the property 
involved. It is important to note that our probate code 
from its very inception has and still does recognize 
both public and private sales and the differentiation 
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thereof in connection with property sold or to be sold 
in probate proceedings. 
Section 75-10-2, U.C.A., to which appellant refers, 
simply reads as follows: 
"Sale to be reported to and confirmed by 
court. All sales must be reported under oath to, 
and confirmed by, the Court before the title to 
the property sold passes, except as hereinafter 
otherwise provided.'' 
Section 75-10-3 immediately following that section, 
however, states: 
"Sales-Report and confirmation. The ex-
ecutor or adminstrator may sell any property 
of the estate without order of the court, at either 
public or private sale and with or without notice 
as he may determine, but must make return of 
such sales in all cases; and if directions are given 
in the will as to the mode of selling, or the par-
ticular property to be sold, such direction must 
be observed. In any case, no title passes unless 
the sale is confirmed by the court." 
The provisions of 75-10-2 are duplicated by 75-
10-3, except for the references in the latter to both 
public and private sales. The purpose, of course, of 
the reference to this section is again to emphasize that 
our probate code expressly recognizes that sales of 
property thereunder may be at either public or private 
sale, but that the requirements of Section 75-10-12 
relate only to private sales. 
The law is simple and clear and adopts a common 
sense rule as to what is a public sale as opposed to a 
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private sale. A public sale is simply a sale in which 
the public, upon proper notice, is invited or permitted 
to participate. See annotation 4 A.L.R. 2d, 575, and 
\iV ords and Phrases, Vol. 35, page 625. Even though 
the original offer to purchase the property may have 
been initiated on the basis of a private sale, the sale as 
conducted clearly was a public sale and the confirma-
tion was of a public sale, after due notice where every-
one and anyone desiring to do so had an opportunity 
to bid on the property. See in this connection Plimpton 
vs. Mattakeunk Cabin Colony, (D.C. Conn.) 9 Fed. 
Supp. 288, 306, in which the Court held that where 
equity receivers entered into a contract of sale with 
the purchaser, subject to confirmation by the Court, 
and notice was given to all interested parties and other 
bids were invited, and there was opportunity for fair 
competitive bidding, and a sale was confirmed at a 
public hearing, such sale was a "public sale" and not 
a private sale as respects validity, and that the con-
firmation thereof should not be disturbed. 
Referring again to Section 75-10-12 entitled "Con-
firmation of Private Sale" it commences by defining 
the matter to which it relates as follows: 
"No sale of real property at private sale shall 
be confirmed by the Court unless ... " 
Note that it does not say "at public or private 
sale" as do other sections of the probate code, nor does 
it simply refer to "sale" generally, but is definite and 
specific in limiting such to private sales. 
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There is, of course, an obvious reason for the pro-
vision of Section 75-10-12 in requiring a current ap-
praisal before confirmation of a private sale, because 
at a private sale there is opportunity for unscrupulous 
executors or administrators to connive with persons 
interested in purchasing property at private sale so 
as to permit them to obtain said property at less than 
its reasonable value, to the detriment of others inter-
ested in the estate. When, however, the property is 
opened up for public bid in open court after notice, the 
prime reason for the current appraisal disappears in 
the face of competitive public bidding. 
The code sections which vitally affect this matter, 
other than those heretofore quoted and which clearly 
give the Court authority to make a valid sale and order 
confirming the same, are Section 75-10-15 and 75-10-16, 
which read as follows: 
75-10-15. Vacationand resale for better price. 
If the sale was unfair or the sum bid dispro-
portionate to the value, or if it appears that a 
sum exceeding such bid by at least ten per cent, 
exclusive of the expenses of a new sale, may be 
obtained, the court may vacate the sale and direct 
another to be had. If an off er greater in amount 
than that named in the return is made to the 
court in writing by a responsible person, the 
court may accept such off er and confirm the sale 
to such person, or order a new sale. (Italics 
added). 
75-10-16. Confirmation of sale. If it appears 
to the court that the sale was legally made and 
fairly conducted, and that the sum bid is not 
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disproportionate to the value of the property 
sold, and that a greater sum, as above specified, 
cannot be obtained, or if the increased bid men-
tioned in the next preceding section is accepted 
by the court, the court must make an order con-
firming the sale, and directing conveyances to 
be executed. The sale from that time is confirmed 
and valid. If after the confirmation the purchaser 
neglects or refuses to comply with the terms 
of sale, the court may, on motion of the executor 
or administrator and after notice to the pur-
chaser, order a resale of the property to be made. 
If the amount realized on such resale does not 
cover the bid and the expenses of the previous 
sale, such purchaser is liable to the estate for 
the deficiency. 
\Ve observe that Section 75-10-15 relates to all 
sales without distinction as to whether they are public 
or private. In the matter before the Court, a bid was 
made by Holt and Webber exceeding the previous 
bid by at least 10%; the Court thereupon had authority 
to vacate the attempted sale to Roderick. Furthermore, 
at that time and in the public bidding, an offer in a 
greater amount than that previously bid was in fact 
made to the Court in writing (R 17) by a responsible 
person. The Court thereupon under the authority of 
the last sentence of Section 75-10-15 accepted such 
greater offer and confirmed th sale. (We point out 
that the last sentence of 75-10-15 seems to stand alone 
in authorizing the Court to act when conditions therein 
set forth are met.) The Court thereafter made and 
entered its formal order confirming the sale and direct-
iug the conveyance of the property to Holt and Webber 
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( R 6) . The sale from that time was confirmed and valid. 
(Section 75-10-16). 
The trial court in its sound discretion overruled 
the objections of the petitioner and appellant herei11 
to the confirmation, and its motion to set aside the order 
confirming the sale. This court has held in Nielson's 
Estate vs. Nielson, 107 Ut. 564, 155 P. 2d. 968, that 
where a sale of property is made on a representation 
in the petition that it is for the benefit and best interest 
of the estate, and the Court having confirmed the sale, 
that: 
''In reviewing an order confirming a sale or 
denying application for confirmation of sale, 
such order will not be set aside except upon a 
showing of abuse of discretion. There must be 
a showing of misapprehension of the facts by 
the court or capricious or arbitrary action with-
out due regard to facts and circumstances." 
There has been no showing, nor any scintilla of proof 
that the Court did abuse its discretion in this matter. 
C. 11he Executrix· is Estopped from Attacking the 
Validity of the Sale and Confirmation. 
The petition for confirmation of sale was made and 
signed by Sarah Jane McFarland, who is both the 
Executrix of the Estate and likewise the sole bene-
ficiary under the Will of the decedent ( R. 29) . It is 
a uniform rule of law that a petitioner may not object 
to the confirmation of the sale, but waives the objection 
through the petition filed; furthermore, that objections 
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do not lie if they could have been raised on the hearing 
for confirmation. See Bancroft Probate Practice 2d 
' Edition, Sections 608 and 609. The same volume at 
Section 611, page 190, further sets forth the rule that 
if the only persons interested have ratified there can 
be no proper objections to the confirmation. In 34 
C.J.S., Section 615, Executors and Administrators, 
the rule is stated thus: 
"Neither the representative who made the sale 
nor his surety can impeach the validity of the 
proceedings instituted and conducted by such 
representative." 
Again in that same volume, Section 616 at page 
593, it is stated: 
"One who might otherwise successfully attack 
a sale may be estopped from so doing under the 
principles governing estoppel generally. Thus, 
one will nc;>t be heard to complain of defects for 
the existence of which he is himself responsible, 
or to object to the regularity of proceedings had 
on his own application, or instigation, or which 
he has aided in carrying into effect or consented 
to." 
It should be obvious under the authorities above 
set forth that the executrix, being the sole beneficiary 
and the only one having an interest in this matter, 
having initiated the proceedings and having requested 
the Court to confirm the sale, clearly has waived any 
objection to the proceedings thereunder or the validity 
thereof and is estopped to object to the sale made by 
the Court and the order of the Court confirming such 
15 
sale. Parenthetically in this regard, it should be stated 
that the full purchase price represented by the offer 
of Holt and 'Vebber, which was accepted and con-
firmed, was long ago paid to the executrix and ha~ 
never been returned or tendered back. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we respectfully 
submit that the appeal should be dismissed and the 
order of the lower court affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ZAR E. HAYES 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAlHP'l'ON 
& WATKISS 
600 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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